Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Özkes, Ali ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8720-2494 and Sanver, Remzi (2021) Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited. Social Choice and Welfare.

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Abstract

We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.

Item Type: Article
Divisions: Departments > Strategy and Innovation > Markets and Strategy
Version of the Document: Published
Variance from Published Version: None
Depositing User: Ali Özkes
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2021 12:45
Last Modified: 05 Jul 2021 12:45
Related URLs:
FIDES Link: https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/98543/
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/8193

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