Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information

Berger, Ulrich ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6317-8402 and De Silva, Hannelore (2021) Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information. PLoS ONE, 16 (6). ISSN 1932-6203

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Abstract

Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obtaining information on reputation. Even for small information costs successful deterrence is never evolutionarily stable. Here we use game-theoretic modelling and agent-based simulations to resolve this puzzle and to clarify under which conditions deterrence can nevertheless evolve and when it is bound to fail. Paradoxically, rich information on defenders’ past actions leads to a breakdown of deterrence, while with only minimal information deterrence can be highly successful. We argue that reputation-based deterrence sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: All data are available from the GitHub repository at https://github.com/hadesi1234/deterrence.
Divisions: Departments > Finance, Accounting and Statistics
Departments > Volkswirtschaft
Departments > Volkswirtschaft > Analytische Volkswirtschaftslehre
Forschungsinstitute > Kryptoökonomie
Version of the Document: Published
Depositing User: Gertraud Novotny
Date Deposited: 16 Jun 2021 11:10
Last Modified: 16 Jun 2021 11:10
Related URLs:
FIDES Link: https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/100125/
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/8165

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