Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern-Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

Okada, Isamu ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9943-2668 and Yamamoto, Hitoshi ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7966-2629 and Uchida, Satochi (2020) Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern-Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 11 (1). ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Part of this work was supported by JSPS (Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research) 17KK0055(IO), 17H02044(IO and HY), 18H03498 (HY and IO), 19K21570 (HY) and 19H02376 (IO and HY).
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; evolutionary game; private assessment; social dilemma; indirect reciprocity; reputation; image score; Kandori norm
Classification Codes: JEL Classification: C62; C72; C73
Divisions: Departments > Informationsverarbeitung u Prozessmanag.
Version of the Document: Published
Depositing User: Gertraud Novotny
Date Deposited: 08 May 2020 12:25
Last Modified: 08 May 2020 12:26
Related URLs:
FIDES Link: https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/94623/
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/7598

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