Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Ozkes, Ali ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8720-2494 and Sanver, M. Remzi (2020) Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited. Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series, 10/2020. WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.

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Abstract

We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.

Item Type: Paper
Keywords: anonymity, efficiency, neutrality, resoluteness
Classification Codes: JEL Codes: D71, D72, D82
Divisions: Departments > Strategy and Innovation > Markets and Strategy
Depositing User: Gerlinde Rattasits-Kaas
Date Deposited: 04 Mar 2020 16:18
Last Modified: 17 Sep 2020 11:17
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/7507

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