Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy

Sausgruber, Rupert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0769-862X and Sonntag, Axel and Tyran, Jean-Robert (2019) Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy. WU International Taxation Research Paper Series, 2019-05. WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Universität Wien, Vienna.

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Abstract

We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a "dividend of Democracy" in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.

Item Type: Paper
Additional Information: Editors: Eva Eberhartinger, Michael Lang, Rupert Sausgruber and Martin Zagler (Vienna University of Economics and Business), and Erich Kirchler (University of Vienna). Financed by the Austrian Science Fund, project number I2027-G16.
Keywords: redistribution, disincentive effect, voting, legitimacy, real-effort task, lab experiment
Classification Codes: JEL Classification: C92, D31, D72, H23
Depositing User: ePub Administrator
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2019 13:31
Last Modified: 31 Oct 2019 13:38
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/7272

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