Walter Stöhr
Selective Self-Reliance and Endogenous Regional Development - Preconditions and Constraints

Original Citation:
Stöhr, Walter
(1984)
Selective Self-Reliance and Endogenous Regional Development - Preconditions and Constraints.
IIR-Discussion Papers, 19. WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.
This version is available at: https://epub.wu.ac.at/6147/
Available in ePubWU: March 2018

ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the scholarly output of the WU.

Walter B. Stöhr

SELECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE AND ENDOGENOUS REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT - PRECONDITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

I I R - DISCUSSION 19 1984
Selective Self-reliance and Endogenous Regional Development - Pre-conditions and Constraints

1. Traditional models of spatial development based on external impulses and trans-territorial penetration

Traditional models of development which prevailed particularly during the quarter of a century following World War II have been based on diffusion and modernization theory according to which production factors (particularly capital, technology and skilled labour) were to be transferred from highly developed to less developed areas (so-called "spread effects", Myrdal 1957), usually accompanied by institutional, cultural, legal, political, and frequently also police/military penetration of the latter by highly developed areas or countries (Stöhr 1981/b). In another context I have called this "development from above" (Stöhr 1981/a).

In most cases this model of development has been characterized by a vertical division of labour and unequal terms of trade to the detriment of less developed areas, as well as by power penetration, fragmentation and marginalization of less developed areas (Galtung 1980, p.22). Along with it went a "creaming" of the natural and human resources of less developed areas for world demand, the formation of economic mono-structure and a dequalification of their remaining labour force (Stöhr 1981/c, Stöhr 1983).

As a consequence, these strategies led to an erosion of the medium and long-term development potential of less developed areas and to an increasing dependence of the latter on inputs from highly developed areas. They thereby formed the basis of
a cumulative process of what Giundani and Bassand (1982) have called "mal-development" for less developed peripheral areas.

This is the case in less developed - usually peripheral - areas within nations, as well as at the continental and at the world-wide scale (Galtung 1980/a, Stöhr 1981/b), 1983/b). It was thought that this model would, via the market mechanism, lead to the spatial equalization of development at all these scales. While in terms of indicators of quantitative growth this appeared to come true in the most industrialized countries until the early 1970's, particularly during the quarter of a century following World War II and dominated by relatively high aggregate economic growth rates (Molle et al. 1980), this model completely failed to work after the slow-down of aggregate economic growth rates around the middle of the 1970's, by which most of the spill-over effects from highly developed to less developed areas - caused by the market mechanism - came to a standstill (Stöhr 1983/b).

2. The determinant role of functional, trans-regional organizations

This pattern of spatial development to a considerable extent appears to have been due to the fact that it was mainly determined by functional (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979) trans-regional organizations such as trans-regional central government, development or financial institutions, trans-regional enterprise, etc.. Their behaviour was in general guided by functional feed-back mechanisms between their decisions and trans-regional, organization-wide objectives (aggregate organization-wide return and growth, development, organizational stability, power, etc.). While many of the consequences of their decisions (employment, environmental consequences, demand for services etc.) are territorially defined, there generally is a lack of territorial feed-back mechanisms which would safeguard the pursuing of objectives of territorial
(local, regional, etc.) communities. The functional objectives of these transregional organizations could best be achieved by the trans-territorial economic, cultural and political penetration, reduction of institutional differences, homogenization of demand, etc., which very often were in conflict also with broader objectives of territorial communities such as local/regional identity, self-determination, creativity, solidarity, equal exchange, broad and sustained resource utilization, all objectives essentially related to the concept of self-reliant development (Galtung 1980/b, p.225). Preiswerk (1980/a, p.15) has formulated self-reliance as "more food for the neediest, better health for more people, more satisfaction and self-fulfillment in life, more confidence in oneself and in one's community, and more effective defense against exploitative forces."

3. Selective Self-reliance as a multi-level and multi-dimensional process

First a few terminological remarks seem to be in place. In this volume different terms are used for similar concepts and vice-versa, such as self-reliant, self-determined, endogenous development, etc. (see e.g. John Friedmann's paper above).

Let me therefore briefly define how I use these terms in the present paper:
Each territorial community initially disposes of a certain variety of resources (ecological, human, socio-cultural, institutional, etc.) which I call its endogenous development potential.
Some territorial communities (or certain individuals, enterprises or groups thereof) may have managed to dispose also over resources of other communities and thereby expand their own development potential. Their development in this way is self-determined - but at the expense of resources initially
pertaining to other communities, and therefore not self-reliant (the case of most "metropolitan" centers/countries). Self-reliant development however means self-determined development of territorial communities based essentially on endogenous resources; it therefore requires a combination of the two above-mentioned concepts (restricting quasi-free disposal over external resources for "metropolitan" centres/countries, while making disposal over endogenous resources more complete for "peripheral" communities).

In view of the highly interactive character of our world system, this self-reliance naturally can only be a 'selective' one (Stöhr 1981/d), concentrating on key variables of a specific territorial community's endogenous development.

Self-reliant development can be conceived at different scales such as the national, regional and local one. At all these scales it is essentially concerned with giving priority to the self-determined mobilization of the endogenous development potential of the respective territorial communities and self-determined resistance against trans-territorial penetration where this is detrimental to the sustained development of these communities (Stöhr 1981/b,c,d). Such a strategy I have in another context called development "from below" or a strategy of "selective spatial closure" (Stöhr and Tödtling 1978, Stöhr 1981/a).

Self-reliant (as in fact any sustained) development is an integral process and has various dimensions of which the economic (frequently only pursued so far), socio-cultural, ecological and political-administrative dimensions are the most important ones. x)

In each of these dimensions - as well as in the interrelations between them - one will have to ask whether and under which

---

x) Galtung (1980/a) says "self-reliance as a doctrine is located more in the field of psycho-politics than in that of economics" (p.21). Therefore not only economic, but also "cultural borders, ethnic groupings ... will play a considerable role", as well as political borders, the size of political units and the strength of centre-periphery gradients (p.38 ff.).
conditions self-reliant development seems feasible, and whether the effects of the penetration mentioned above - if they are considered negative - can be counteracted.

It must be said at this point, however, that self-reliant development by no means is a revolutionary idea. "As a form of social behaviour, it has probably existed at all times of human development and in almost every part of the world (Preiswerk, 1980/a, p.11), but it has in many cases been suppressed and disintegrated by external penetration, by development "from above" (Stöhr and Taylor 1981) or by what Galtung (1980/b) calls "vertical" or "alpha" structures.

4. Pre-conditions and constraints of self-reliant development

Self-reliance requires the internal ability and external possibility of territorial communities to mobilize fully their internal resources and endogenous development potential in economic, socio-cultural, environmental and political terms.

Let me start with the political dimension of development as to this author it appears as the key lever for self-reliant development. Political decision-making is a key factor for all other dimensions of development: It may often be constrained by economic, socio-cultural, and ecological conditions, but these may frequently also constitute special advantages for political self-determination. At the same time, however, the mobilization of other dimensions of development usually requires a certain degree of local/regional self-determination.

For each of these dimensions we shall deal with important preconditions which facilitate self-reliant development, and with some of the obstacles which constrain it. We shall furthermore attempt to point out some strategy approaches for overcoming such obstacles, or for using more fully existing preconditions. The pre-conditions and constraints often have a mutual dialectic relationship: self-reliance may be based on favourable internal markets, resource or locational conditions
which are usually naturally or historically determined, but it may also be triggered by great obstacles to it (resource scarcity, locational disadvantage, etc.) which may act as a strong mobilizing factor for overcoming constraints to self-reliant development and the consequences of dependence. This dialectical situation seems to exist particularly in the political and the economic sphere where extreme external dependence may have a particularly mobilizing effect. In many cases it may be that the intermediate situations are the most difficult ones for moving towards a higher degree of self-reliance.

4.1. Political preconditions and constraints
These refer to political structures both internal and external to the respective territorial (local, regional, etc.) units.

- Decentralized power structure and provision of broad access to scarce resources.
A first key condition is a decentralized power and decision-making structure, i.e. little differences in access to societal power, both within the respective territorial unit and to the outside, or what Galtung (1980) has called a flat power gradient.
This represents an egalitarian mechanism which counteracts a cumulative concentration of income (surplus value), wealth and power both between social groups (classes) and between spatial units.
Within territorial units, this includes broad access to scarce resources, particularly to natural resources (especially land), to participation and decision-making in societal institutions, and to information and knowledge.

- Internalization of the cost of development and elimination of free-riding.
These egalitarian societal mechanisms must aim not so much at an equalization of the returns from development - as this would eliminate incentives to make inputs into it - but at as complete as possible an internalization of the cost of development by relating inputs and benefits as closely as possible to each other. These mechanisms should inhibit that either specific social groups (classes) or territorial communities (e.g. cities,
core regions) attempt to develop at the expense of others (Galtung 1980/a, p.13). The growing complexity of economic and societal systems makes this increasingly difficult due to the emergence of public goods and external economies (costs and benefits) at the plant, local, regional and other levels, and the consequent opportunities for free-riders.

One strategy to encounter this problem is the establishment of communal control over the benefits derived from these externalities and public goods. This however usually leads to the construction of large-scale bureaucratic institutions.

Another strategy (potentially to be combined with the first) is to eliminate free-riding by the establishment of direct feedback mechanisms wherever possible between decisions and their respective consequences, as well as between inputs made and benefits derived from the (social, economic, natural, etc.) system. This would reduce the (frequently self-propelled) increase in societal complexity (institutions and bureaucracies creating new institutions and bureaucracies) for redistribution and control, particularly once their own marginal costs exceed their marginal social benefits (Matzner, 1982), and increase their transparency and accountability for internal and public control (Schelsky 1982).

Priority for action at the local and regional levels.
Since externalities initially and most intensely accrue at the local and regional scale (externalities of urbanization and agglomeration, environmental externalities) the establishment of such implicit feedback mechanisms and/or explicit communal control of benefits derived from externalities should with priority be aimed at the local and regional levels (for an approach to this problem from a different angle cf. Friedmann 1982). The establishment of such feedback and/or communal control mechanisms at the local/regional level can reduce the
emergence of allocation problems and the need for (usually still much more complex) regulatory mechanisms at higher scales.

- Neutralization / control of external mediating functions.

Where externalities are derived from interaction at larger scale (inter-regional, inter-national) linking local/regional communities to the "world-encompassing cycle" (Galtung 1980/a, p.30), the respective mediating functions (commercial, financial, transfer of technology, multi-regional enterprise, large-scale organizations and other "beta-structures" in Galtung's terminology) must be subject to broad local/regional communal control by what Galtung (1980/b, p.226) calls "alpha-structures".

As these mediating functions are often performed by members of an externally oriented elite or bourgeoisie of the respective local/regional community, this can frequently also be achieved by implicit self-sustaining societal mechanisms which facilitate that individual mediators benefit more from internal territorial ("horizontal") solidarity, rather than from external functional ("vertical") one.

- Establishment of a continuing territorial adjustment and learning mechanism.

Such communal interaction and feedback mechanisms should facilitate that local/regional resources (natural or human) are not utilized below their full cost of conservation or reproduction, that supply for external markets does not endanger the local/regional capacity for self-sufficiency (Galtung 1980/a, p.32) and to safeguard internal economic, social, political, and environmental interaction required for it. They would thereby constitute a continuing territorial adjustment and learning mechanism.

---

x) For the mechanisms determining "vertical" as against "horizontal" solidarity, see also Singelmann (1981).

xx) "particularly in the field of basic commodities" ... and .. "in times of crisis" (p.32).
- Principle of concentric solidarity
These mechanisms should also facilitate what Galtung (1980/a, p.25) calls the "principle of concentric solidarity" in groups in the same or close-by territorial unit as well as "to those in the same (or a similar) position" (p.26) rather than to groups in different positions or in more distant territorial units.

- External aid only for limited period and to promote self-reliant structures.
If such equity-oriented mechanisms cannot be generated endogenously within local/regional social systems, limited external aid may be required to achieve them. If this happens it should only take place however with "a clear programme for phased withdrawal" and to promote equity-oriented internal control mechanisms or what Galtung (1980/b) calls "beta-structures in their own territorial or non-territorial environment" (p.238). In such cases a certain share of higher-level (external) intervention or investment should under all conditions be reserved for promoting local/regional integration (Galtung, 1980/b, p.223).

- On the part of central government, willingness to at least tolerate - if not promote self-reliant local/regional development is an important precondition (Stöhr 1983/a).

- Linkage to trans-regional cooperative networks has furthermore proved important for self-reliant local/regional development, through what Haque et al. (1977,p.61) have called "committed link cadres" or through information and consulting networks, usually operating on a non-governmental basis (Stöhr 1983/a and b).

- Promotion of potential societal innovation capacity of structurally weak "peripheral" areas.
Many regions outside of the major metropolitan or core areas are structurally weak particularly because they lack innovation potential. This seems to a great extent due to a lack of
internal regional interaction patterns: as mentioned above between training, research, financing, and production activities but also regarding to participation and access to decision-making (Stöhr 1983/a). This applies both to access to political decisions in view of the increasing concentration of political power at national and supra-national levels, and to access to entrepreneurial decision in view of the increasing importance of multi-regional/national firms. Structurally weak areas lacking innovation potential are usually also "peripheral" with regard to entrepreneurial and political decision-making centers. This applies both to less developed rural areas and to most "old" industrial areas.

In geographical terms, political conditions for self-reliant development usually improve with increasing distance from major power centers. In peripheral areas on the fringe of central power gradients, central control is usually weaker and therefore facilitates better conditions for the creation of autochthonous power. This is the case particularly in peripheries which are located on the fringes between two central power gradients, if some freedom of choice for alternative allegiances exists. Under such conditions the established central power may purport what Waterston (1965) has called a "wooship" relation and concede a higher degree of self-determination than it would otherwise be prepared to grant—in order to retain at least a minimum of allegiance. x) Under such conditions of external competition peripheral areas may often become foci of societal innovation if liberal internal structures can be retained. xx) They may however also conduce central power to even more repression if complete disvinculation is feared. xxx)

x) Relevant examples are the status of political semi-autonomy or of special economic status (e.g. free trade or production zones) granted to peripheral areas both in market economies and in socialist countries.

xx) As examples may be considered at the fringe between power blocks Yugoslavia and Hungary. On the fringe between nation states the Basque Country, Elsass-Lothringen, Northern Italy and South Tyrol, etc.

xxx) An example is the recent fate of Poland, or historically the feudal structures on the fringe of large empires in Europe (Rokkan 1980), the comendador system on the fringe of the Spanish empire in Latin America.
Physical obstacles and distance favouring self-reliance. Physical obstacles or physical distance frequently turn out to be an aid to self-reliant development (in the sense of "spatial closure"), particularly in mountaineous areas. In such areas (e.g. in many Alpine ones) natural conditions have made penetration and domination from the outside difficult and at the same time enforced direct internal territorial feedback mechanisms between man and his environment, as well as between different social groups, which favoured the establishment of innovative and egalitarian social structures. These were only periodically unbalanced by the penetration of outside hierarchical institutions (feudal, aristocratic, religious, capitalistic) against which these territorial communities usually showed high power of resistance.

In such peripheral areas frequently also communal forms of ownership and of production have been retained (e.g. in the border areas between France and Italy, between Northern Portugal and Galicia, the Mondragon cooperative complex in the Basque Country, and probably many others).

4.2. Socio-Cultural preconditions and constraints

An important pre-condition for self-reliant development is a high degree of broad social and technological innovativeness which is usually promoted by the forementioned political conditions. Where it does not exist, it has usually been eroded by extended periods of external penetration and dominance, which usually has reduced the endogenous intellectual elite or alienated them from regional objectives and value systems.

- Promotion of a broad autochthonous intellectual elite and their integration with regional society.

A major restriction for self-reliant development is the dependence of a region or country on narrow, often externally oriented
or linked functional elites, lacking territorial responsibility, control, and broader territorial innovative interaction. Its broadening and regional integration as described above therefore appears as an important - though usually not sufficient - precondition for the recuperation of social and technological innovativeness.

- Territorial socio-cultural identity: historical or future oriented.
A further important pre-condition is a high degree of territorial identity and communality in ethnic, cultural or historical terms, which is often facilitated by the existence of an endogenous cultural elite. Such regional identity may be available on a historical basis. However, it can also be established (or reinforced) on a future-oriented basis, via the promotion of the consciousness of a common future fate or of common characteristics and problems.

Future-oriented territorial identity and communality can usually be promoted by the above mentioned devolution of decision-making power to territorial communities which may trigger an endogenous territorial feedback mechanism in the following sense (cf. also Stöhr 1983/a):

- Increased territorial self-determination (devolution of decision-making powers)
- Increased territorial identity
- Improved economic and social living levels
- Increased (societal and technological) innovative capacity
Endogenous learning capacity as a precondition for free information flows without unilateral dependence. Such territorial feedback mechanisms may promote the endogenous learning capacity described above which should enable territorial communities to react more creatively to changes in external conditions (Rapoport 1982). John Bryden considers this as "underlying conditions - educational, cultural, economic, social - which permit change to take place at local levels, which supply information relevant to change based on local resources, which encourage debate and local articulation of alternative policies and practices, which increase levels of confidence and self-respect (regional identity, etc.), and make local sense of the continuum from past through present to future" (personal letter, June 1983). Examples of such endogenous feedback mechanisms increasing the regional learning capacity are to be found in the endogenous research-training-production-innovation-financing complex of the Mondragon cooperative federation in the Basque Country in Spain (Thomas and Logan 1982), or as a consequence of the devolution of administrative and planning functions in Western Scotland where it triggered the emergence of regional editorial, research and training institutions and of plants processing regional resources (Clarke 1981, Stöhr 1983/a).

Endogenous feedback and learning mechanisms of this kind should also permit the free flow of ideas and of information without increasing unilateral external dependence. They should facilitate "utilizing both endogenous and exogenous science and technologies ... to design tools and contrive methods .. best suited to the (respective) natural and social environment" (Tsurumi, K., quoted in Galtung 1980/b, p.241/2) and to "reject techniques that persuppose that other local, national or regional units are cast in the role of delivering the raw materials or the raw labour" (p.239). Although such an endogenous learning process may lead to "reinventing something already invented elsewhere", this "probable 'loss'
in efficiency ... is more than offset by the gain in self-confidence ... " (Galtung 1980/a, p.24).

4.3. Economic pre-conditions and constraints

Many of the economic pre-conditions for self-reliant development also are of a dialectic kind. Some of the more important ones are:

- **Sufficient endogenous resources** (particularly natural ones) and internal markets to facilitate a capacity for self-sufficiency in times of crisis, \(^x\) especially in the field of basic commodities (Galtung 1980/a, p.32). However, an increasing scarcity of such resources (e.g. through population growth, lack of expansion room, separation of resource frontiers, of former markets or of sources of supply) may also lead to endogenous innovation thrusts and to a higher degree of self-reliant development. \(^xx\)

- **Diversified and decentralized economic structure** with regard to: distribution by sectors, by size of enterprise, and by geographical location.

\(^x\)Original patterns of population distribution have normally been guided by this requirement and were mainly modified by precautions against extreme natural catastrophies (unexpected flooding, dryness, earthquakes etc.) or by the application of special technology (irrigation, terracing, production and transport technologies etc.). Major deviations from such a pattern furthermore were based on the utilization of external resources, of external markets and/or of unilateral external power penetration must therefore be considered parasitic. They have usually led to the loss of territorial feed-back and regulatory mechanisms such as between decision-making and its social consequences, the abolition of traditional social mechanisms to bare or migratory population explosion, or to retain physical adaptability to changing natural conditions (comparable to the phenomenon of the Saurier extinction).

\(^xx\)This has been described for pre-historic periods by Renfrew 1973, for historic periods in Europe by North and Thomas 1973, and for endogenous agricultural development by Wilkinson 1973.
However, a highly centralized economic monostructure may also promote self-reliant development if the cost of such concentration excells and/or if its exposure to external change or crisis, e.g. of mono-structured industrial areas, leads to unmanageable situations.

High degree of (regional) internal economic interaction (in terms of input-output or service relations, financial circuits, etc.), particularly in basic commodities so that the respective territorial units actually represent "regions" (defined in the classical sense as having more relations internally than towards the outside).

However, strong external interaction and unilateral dependence from outside may also trigger self-reliant local/regional development. This often happens in centrally planned economies for the satisfaction of needs which cannot be adequately supplied by such systems or from the outside, or in market economies dominated by few large enterprises (emergence of "grey" local markets or of "shadow production"); or if the crisis potential of external dependence becomes acute (e.g. in the case of natural hazards, external isolation, war, etc.).

A typical such dialectic response by central governments is the "Cooperative Action Programme on Local Initiatives for Employment Creation" in the frame of the OECD introduced in June, 1982, now supported by over a dozen West European countries. It started by concentrating on "old" industrial areas subjected to major restructuring crises.

This criterion may in fact be useful for the delimitation of territorial units for which strategies of self-reliant development (or of selective spatial closure) are applied. Should this criterion not apply to pre-determined areal units, an enlargement may need to be sought - preferably to include adjoining areas with a similar level of development, in order to increase the endogenous development potential with as little increase in unilateral external dependence as possible. Limiting factors however are contained in the previously mentioned political and social conditions.

A typical case in point was the push towards endogenous industrialization in Latin America during the economic crisis of the 1930's and the interruption of transport routes during World War II.
Communal instruments facilitating innovation and the reinvestment of surplus value within the region.

In many structurally weak areas the problem is not so much the lack of surplus value but its leakage to other areas due to a lack of endogenous innovation and surplus recycling capacity. Required would be the allocation of surplus value to innovation-oriented training and research within the region and, preferably related to it, a regionally directed financing institution with the task to channel regional savings and profits into regional investment. The impact an endogenous interconnected innovation and financing mechanism can have is shown e.g. in the Mondragon Cooperative Group in the Basque Country (Spain) where a highly active regional Savings Bank (Caja Laboral Popular) is effectively linked with a research center (Ikerlan) and various training facilities: Caja Laboral Popular regularly has a surplus of deposits and is by statute obliged to invest only within the Basque Country; instead of following the easy path of allocating its investment to the most profitable projects presented to it "by chance", irrespective of their location, it is therefore encouraged to incentivate itself - via its affiliated research institute and cooperative group - innovative and profitable projects within the Basque Country. This has made them an important innovative motor within the Basque Country; The Mondragon Cooperative Group has been amongst the most innovative sectors and amongst the few having created new enterprises and new jobs even in recent years; this at a time when most of the rest of the Basque economy has been in serious crisis, with numerous plant closures and heavy losses of jobs particularly in the traditionally dominant sectors of the Basque economy (Stöhr 1983/a).

4.4. Ecological preconditions and constraints

Self-reliance in ecological terms means that development must safeguard the renewal of ecological resources in a spirit of spatial and temporal solidarity (Galtung 1980/b,
p.235), both internally (between generations) and externally (between territorial units).

- **(Re-)Establishment of territorial ecological self-regulating mechanisms.**
  Internally between generations means that the present generation must not develop on account of ecological resources required by future generations. This can best be safeguarded by the (re)establishment of territorial ecological self-regulating mechanisms by which "those who destroy ecological balances suffer their own action", thereby "constituting a defense against depletion/pollution" (Galtung 1980, p.235).

- **Restriction of territorial 'expansionist' tendencies.**
  Externally between territorial units this requires that outside (extra-regional) ecological resources be used in the same cautious and future-oriented way as internal ones and that full returns for their renewal are made. This requires a restriction of territorial 'expansionist' tendencies (by, what Galtung, 1980, p.237, calls 'alpha' structures) via trans-territorial functional organizations such as trans-regional corporations or state organizations (p.226).

- **Regional equalization of the benefits/costs of environmental exploitation/conservation.**
  Less developed areas are often forced (or tempted) to develop by the fullest possible utilization (or sale) of their own ecological resources. In this case it needs to be safeguarded that the countervalue received in return be (1) sufficient to cover the recuperation/renewal of these ecological resources, and that internally this countervalue be (2) actually employed for this purpose (and not, e.g., for the enrichment of intermediaries, of the groups owning capital or land, etc.).

- If a superordinate (national or international) interest in a far-reaching conservation of such ecological resources exists (e.g. for the establishment of natural conservation
areas) the communities living in such areas should in return receive sufficient financial resources to facilitate their endogenous development - in magnitude comparable to the opportunity benefit of a long-range sustained exploitation of these resources (for tourist, agricultural, mineral etc. development).
References


Friedmann J. and C.Weafer (1979), Territory and Function, the Evaluation of Regional Planning, Edward Arnold , London


Guindani, Silvio et Michel Bassand (1982), Maldeveloppement Régional et Identité, Lausanne, Presses Polytechniques Romandes

Haque, W., N.Metha, A.Rahman and P.Wignaraja (1977), "Towards a theory of rural development", Development Dialogue, Nr.2


Molle et al. (1980), Regional Disparity and Economic Development in the European Community. Farnborough, Saxon House


Stöhr, W. (1981/c) "Alternative Strategien für die Entwicklung peripherer Gebiete bei abgeschwächtem Wirtschaftswachstum", DISP Nr.61, Dokumente und Informationen zur schweizerischen Orts-, Regional- und Landesplanung, ETH Zürich, p.5 ff.


Stöhr W. and D.R.F.Taylor (eds.) (1981), Development From Above or Below? The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries, Chichester: J.Wiley & Sons Ltd.


English version: "Quantitative, qualitative, and structural variables in the evaluation of Regional Development Policies in Western Europe", presented at the Symposium on "Division of Labour, Specialization and Technical Development", held at Linköping, Sweden, June, 1982

