Co-action equilibrium fails to predict choices in mixed-strategy settings

Berger, Ulrich (2018) Co-action equilibrium fails to predict choices in mixed-strategy settings. Scientific Reports, 8 (751). pp. 1-5. ISSN 2045-2322

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Abstract

Social projection is the tendency to project one's own characteristics onto others. This phenomenon can potentially explain cooperation in prisoner's dilemma experiments and other social dilemmas. The social projection hypothesis has recently been formalized for symmetric games as co-action equilibrium and for general games as consistent evidential equilibrium. These concepts have been proposed to predict choice behavior in experimental one-shot games. We test the predictions of the co-action equilibrium concept in a simple binary minimizer game experiment. We find no evidence of social projection.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
Keywords: Cultural evolution, Human behaviour, Social evolution
Divisions: Departments > Volkswirtschaft
Version of the Document: Published
Depositing User: Ulrich Berger
Date Deposited: 16 Jan 2018 13:47
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2020 15:23
Related URLs:
FIDES Link: https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/84532/
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/5976

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