Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games

Berger, Ulrich (2009) Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games. BioSystems, 97 (3). pp. 165-167. ISSN 0303-2647

[img]
Preview
PDF
2009_BioSys.pdf

Download (122kB)

Abstract

We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher's website. Access to the published version requires a subscription.
Keywords: Prisoner's Dilemma, Evolutionary game, Cooperation, Donor-recipient game
Divisions: Departments > Volkswirtschaft > Analytische Volkswirtschaftslehre
Version of the Document: Submitted
Depositing User: Gertraud Novotny
Date Deposited: 12 Jun 2017 15:25
Last Modified: 30 Jul 2017 03:12
Related URLs:
FIDES Link: https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/46684/
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/5590

Actions

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics