Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited

Berger, Ulrich (2008) Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited. Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (1). pp. 292-301. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns [V. Krishna, Learning in games with strategic complementarities, HBS Working Paper 92-073, Harvard University, 1992]. This result remained unpublished, and it relies on a specific tie-breaking rule. Here we prove an extension of it by showing that the ordinal version of strategic complementarities suffices. The proof does not rely on tie-breaking rules and provides some intuition for the result.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher's website. Access to the published version requires a subscription.
Keywords:	Fictitious Play, Learning Process, Strategic Complementarities, Ordinal Complementarities
Classification Codes:	JEL C72, D83
Divisions:	Departments > Volkswirtschaft > Analytische Volkswirtschaftslehre
Version of the Document:	Submitted
Depositing User:	Gertraud Novotny
Date Deposited:	12 Jun 2017 15:18
Last Modified:	27 Jul 2017 21:46
Related URLs:	http://www.elsevier.com
FIDES Link:	https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/42675/
URI:	https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/5589

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