Berger, Ulrich (2008) Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited. Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (1). pp. 292-301. ISSN 0022-0531
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Abstract
Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns [V. Krishna, Learning in games with strategic complementarities, HBS Working Paper 92-073, Harvard University, 1992]. This result remained unpublished, and it relies on a specific tie-breaking rule. Here we prove an extension of it by showing that the ordinal version of strategic complementarities suffices. The proof does not rely on tie-breaking rules and provides some intuition for the result.
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher's website. Access to the published version requires a subscription. |
Keywords: | Fictitious Play, Learning Process, Strategic Complementarities, Ordinal Complementarities |
Classification Codes: | JEL C72, D83 |
Divisions: | Departments > Volkswirtschaft > Analytische Volkswirtschaftslehre |
Version of the Document: | Submitted |
Depositing User: | Gertraud Novotny |
Date Deposited: | 12 Jun 2017 15:18 |
Last Modified: | 27 Jul 2017 21:46 |
Related URLs: | |
FIDES Link: | https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/42675/ |
URI: | https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/5589 |
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