Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information

Fellner, Gerlinde and Sausgruber, Rupert and Traxler, Christian (2013) Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11 (3). pp. 634-660. ISSN 1542-4766


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We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (authors' abstract)

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher's website. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. The original publication is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.
Keywords: Field experiment / enforcement strategies / compliance / perceptions
Classification Codes: JEL K42, C93
Divisions: Departments > Volkswirtschaft > Finanzwissenschaft u öffentl. Wirtschaft
Version of the Document: Accepted for Publication
Variance from Published Version: Minor
Depositing User: ePub Administrator
Date Deposited: 06 May 2014 12:29
Last Modified: 03 Sep 2017 03:08
Related URLs:
FIDES Link: https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/62908/
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/4137


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