Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies

Grandner, Thomas (2000) Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies. Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 71. Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.


Download (310kB)


In this paper a vertically structured duopolistic market with unionized price setting firms is analyzed. The form of the contract of the transactions between upstream and downstream firms can be linear pricing, franchising or vertical integration. It is known from literature (Irmen 1997) that the price elasticity of the industry demand and the degree of product differentiation are the decisive factors in the determination of the profit maximizing form of the contract. In this paper it is shown that the bargaining power of the union is an additional factor. With a higher bargaining power linear pricing becomes less preferable. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Paper
Keywords: vertical integration / trade unions
Classification Codes: JEL L22, J51
Divisions: Departments > Volkswirtschaft
Depositing User: Repository Administrator
Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2002 10:31
Last Modified: 22 Oct 2019 00:41
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/1588


View Item View Item


Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics