A simulation study of managerial compensation

Sallans, Brian and Pfister, Alexander and Dorffner, Georg (2003) A simulation study of managerial compensation. Working Papers SFB "Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science", 101. SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.


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A computational economics model of managerial compensation is presented. Risk-averse managers are simulated, and shown to adopt more risk-taking under the influence of stock options. It is also shown that stock options can both help a new entrant compete in an established market; and can help the incumbent firm fight off competition by promoting new exploration and risk-taking. In the case of the incumbent, the stock options are shown to be most effective when introduced as a response to the arrival of a new entrant, rather than used as a standard part of the compensation package. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Paper
Keywords: Führungskraft / Vergütung / Aktienoption / Simulation
Divisions: Departments > Informationsverarbeitung u Prozessmanag. > Produktionsmanagement > Taudes
Departments > Finance, Accounting and Statistics > Statistics and Mathematics
Departments > Marketing > Service Marketing und Tourismus
Departments > Informationsverarbeitung u Prozessmanag. > Informationswirtschaft
Depositing User: Repository Administrator
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2003 10:22
Last Modified: 22 Oct 2019 00:41
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/1462


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