A note on unionized firms' incentive to integrate vertically

Grandner, Thomas (2000) A note on unionized firms' incentive to integrate vertically. Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 70. Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.

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Abstract

In this paper I analyze a vertically structured monopolized market with unionized firms. I compare two types of contracts: vertical integration and franchising. With franchising and wage bargaining at the firm level the union in the downstream firm is either very powerful or has no bargaining power at all, depending on the specific time structure of the model. These arguments could make integration preferable for the profit owners even if integration is accompanied by small transaction costs. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Paper
Keywords: vertical integration / trade unions
Classification Codes: JEL L22, J51
Divisions: Departments > Volkswirtschaft
Depositing User: Repository Administrator
Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2002 10:03
Last Modified: 22 Oct 2019 00:41
URI: https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/1276

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