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Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game

Sasaki, Tatsuya and Okada, Isamu (2015) Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game. BioSystems, 131. pp. 51-59. ISSN 0303-2647

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Abstract

It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here, we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness. (authors' abstract)

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: T.S. was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P27018-G11. T.S. also thanks to former financial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): TECT I-106 G11 to Ulf Dieckmann at IIASA through a grant for the research project The Adaptive Evolution of Mutualistic Interactions as part of the multinational collaborative research project Mutualisms, Contracts, Space, and Dispersal (BIOCONTRACT) selected by the European Science Foundation as part of the European Collaborative Research (EUROCORES) Programme The Evolution of Cooperation and Trading (TECT). I.O. acknowledges support by Grants-in-aid for Scientific Research from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 22520160 and 26330387.
Keywords: evolution of cooperation / snowdrift game / replicator dynamics / adaptive dynamics / evolutionary branching / speciation in reverse
Divisions: Departments > Informationsverarbeitung u Prozessmanag.
Version of the Document: Published
Variance from Published Version: None
Depositing User: Elena Simukovic
Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2016 10:56
Last Modified: 10 Feb 2017 10:12
Related URLs:
URI: http://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/5028

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