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Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game

Zylbersztejn, Adam (2014) Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game. Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 161. WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.

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Abstract

Several experimental studies show that ex post communication mitigates opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, is nonetheless still obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for two channels by which ex post communication may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves emotions induced by others' expressed disapproval. The presence of ex post communication strongly fosters pro-social behavior. The data do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring the emotion-based explanation instead. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Paper
Keywords: Public goods game / Voluntary Contribution Mechanism / Ex post communication
Classification Codes: JEL C72, D83
Divisions: Departments > Volkswirtschaft
Depositing User: Claudia Tering-Raunig
Date Deposited: 29 Jan 2014 10:58
Last Modified: 29 Jan 2014 10:58
URI: http://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/4075

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