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Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity

Berger, Ulrich (2010) Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 72 (1). pp. 30-37. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others' previous reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature. Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation. (author's abstract)

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher's website. Access to the published version may require a subscription.
Keywords: evolution / cooperation / prisoner's dilemma / indirect reciprocity / scoring rule / first-order information
Classification Codes: JEL C72 , D83
Divisions: Departments > Volkswirtschaft > Analytische Volkswirtschaftslehre
Version of the Document: Accepted for Publication
Variance from Published Version: Minor
Depositing User: Dissertation Administrator
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2011 14:34
Last Modified: 24 Nov 2016 13:24
Related URLs:
FIDES Link: https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/results/52037/
URI: http://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/3273

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